Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
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INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978' (FISA) has
played a prominent role in the legal response to terrorism after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Following the attacks, amendments to
FISA became a high-profile part of the controversial Patriot Act.2 In
December 2005, FISA regained the spotlight when the New York
Times revealed that the Bush Administration had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct domestic surveillance of international communications without obtaining FISA orders.' In August
2007, FISA was in the headlines again when Congress passed a controversial amendment to the statute, the Protect America Act of 2007.
All of these controversies touched on different parts of the same
question: is FISA outdated, and if it should be updated, how should it
change? This broad question divides into two issues, the first relating
to our basic values and the second relating to their implementation.
The first question is whether FISA strikes the proper balance between
privacy and national security. The second question is whether FISA
implements its chosen balance in a way that accurately reflects the
constitutional and technological realities of modern intelligence investigations. As often happens with matters of basic values, little headway
can be made on the first question. Most of us have stubborn instincts
about the severity of the terrorist threat on one hand and the threat to
our civil liberties on the other. Barring another terrorist attack or disclosures of new privacy violations, individual views of what balance
should be struck seem unlikely to budge.
This essay will focus on the second question, whether FISA's design is well tailored to the technology and constitutional law of modt Professor, George Washington University Law School. This essay has been prepared for
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ern intelligence investigations. It argues that whatever balance FISA
strikes, the statute must be rewritten to account for changes in both
communications technology and Fourth Amendment doctrine over
the last three decades. Like pet rocks and the Partridge Family, FISA's
approach seemed natural in the 1970s. Its design made considerable
sense in light of the Fourth Amendment law and communications
technology of the era. In the last three decades, however, the constitutional and technological terrain has shifted. No matter what specific
balance FISA strikes, its approach must recognize the new legal and
technological environment.
Today's statute adopts what I will call a "person-focused" approach; its standards depend heavily on the identity and location of
who is being monitored. The statute generally assumes that the subject
of monitoring is a known person, and it then articulates standards for
when that person's communications can be collected. This made sense
in the era of the old-fashioned telephone network, when the government needed to identify a person before knowing what communications line to tap. But modern communications networks work very
differently, and modern Fourth Amendment law accommodates the
shift. Surveillance over modern packet-switched networks is often
"data-focused"; the identity of who sent data or where that person is
located often will be unknown or unknowable. Whereas traditional
investigations were person-focused, tracing from people to their data,
many of today's investigations are data-focused, tracing from data to
the people who sent and received them.
In response to this change, Congress should supplement the existing person-focused FISA authorities with a complementary set of
data-focused authorities. When the identity and/or location of the suspects monitored are unknown, the law should focus on the nature of
the information collected. Surveillance practices should be authorized
when the government establishes a likelihood that surveillance will
yield what I call "terrorist intelligence information" -information
relevant to terrorism investigations-subject to reasonable limits on
the particularity of warrants. Surveillance would revert back to a more
traditional approach if identity and/or location are known. If datafocused surveillance yields information that is specific as to the subject's identity and location, or such information is known from other
sources, then the monitoring should proceed under the traditional
person-focused legal authorities such as the existing FISA. The end
result would be two different regimes of communications surveillance:
a data-focused approach when identities or location are unknown and
a person-focused approach when they are known.
I will make my case in three steps. The first step explores the person-focused approach to foreign intelligence dominant in the 1970s.
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The second step explains the data-focused approach common today.
Finally, the third step argues that the response to this shift should be
to create a parallel set of data-focused surveillance authorities.
I. PERSON-FOCUSED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION IN THE 1970S

Imagine the year is 1978. Jimmy Carter is President. The Bee
Gees, Fleetwood Mac, and Steely Dan top the pop charts.' You can
buy a new Pontiac Trans Am with an optional T-top roof for about
$5,000.6 Meanwhile, over in Washington, Congress is close to passing a
new law to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance. Congress recognizes that spies and terrorists use home phones, public pay phones,
and workplace telephones to communicate with others and share secrets. These spies and terrorists might also share secrets with conspirators in private places such as their apartments or foreign embassies.
The purpose of the new law will be to regulate when the government
needs a warrant to listen in.
But how should the new law work? The technology and constitutional law of the day provided a ready answer: the legal rules should
hinge on the identity of who is being monitored and where the person
is located. Monitoring some people in some places should require a
traditional criminal law warrant; other people in other places should
require a special national security warrant; and still other people in
still other places should require no warrant at all. Surveillance law
should be person-focused, looking to the "who" and "where" of the
individual monitored.
A.

Wiretapping Technology in the 1970s and the
Person-focused Approach

The technology of the 1970s made a person-focused approach
seem natural if not inevitable. At that time, there were three basic
ways the government could snoop on a person's private real-time
communications. First, government agents could actually tap wires,
physically inserting monitoring devices into the circuits that completed the calls. Second, agents could intercept calls sent over the airwaves, such as calls beamed by communications satellites or broadcast

5
The Billboard 200, 1978, online at http://www.billboard.com/bbcom/charts/yearend-chartdisplay.jspf=The+Billboard+200&g=Year-end+Albums&year=1978 (visited Jan 12, 2008) (listing also the Grease soundtrack and Billy Joel to round out the top five).
6
1970s Car Models and Car Prices, The People History, online at http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/70scars.html (visited Jan 12, 2008) (showing car prices ranging from the Ford Maverick
at $1,995 up to the Jaguar XJS at $18,000).
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by radio transmitters. Third, agents could install microphones such as
bugging devices.7
These techniques normally required the government to begin by
identifying a particular person whose communications would be monitored. Monitoring required a target-a specific subject, often in a
known specific place, who was likely to say specific types of things to
others. Consider a microphone. Microphones pick up sound waves, so
they normally are installed in the same room as the target. The target
must come first and the monitoring later. The same goes for tapping
telephone lines. Before knowing what line to tap, the government had
to identify a target likely to participate in the call. In the technology of
the day, telephone circuits generally traveled in a relatively straight
line between the parties to the communication. The interception occurred somewhere along the path. As a result, wiretapping required a
known target-known in the sense of what phone he used and where
he was located, if not his actual identity-so the government could
trace that particular person's calls and listen to that particular circuit.
B.

Fourth Amendment Law in the 1970s and the
Person-focused Approach

The state of Fourth Amendment law in the 1970s echoed the person-focused nature of 1970s-era intelligence investigations. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, which breaks down into
two questions: first, what is a search, and second, when is a search unreasonable? In the mid-1970s, both inquiries focused heavily on who
was being monitored and where that person was located.
The importance of the subject's identity and his physical environment was central to the Warren Court's famous 1967 decision on the
meaning of "searches," Katz v United States.8 Katz placed illegal bets
from a pay phone, and the FBI taped a microphone to the top of the
phone booth and picked up his calls. The Court's cryptic opinion held
that the government had "searched" Katz because "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'9 But how did the Fourth Amendment
protect "people"? Justice Harlan's concurrence tried to elaborate, and
in so doing, introduced the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test."
According to Harlan, the key was the context in which the person acted:
events inside "a man's home" receive protection, but "objects, activities,

7 See House Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills IX, HR Rep No 95-1283, 95th Cong,
2d Session 50-52 (1978) (discussing the three basic mechanisms of electronic surveillance).
8
389 US 347 (1967).
9
Id at 351.
10 Id at 361 (Harlan concurring).
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or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders" do not."
Although Katz was a Rorschach test, it suggested that the Fourth
Amendment test hinged on the subject's identity and environment. The
government's actions were a "search" because Katz happened to be a
legitimate user of the phone booth who had closed the door and, in doing so, had made the booth his temporarily private space.
The leading precedent on the reasonableness of foreign intelligence searches, handed down in 1972, had a similar focus. In United
States v United States District Court2 ("Keith"), the Supreme Court
ruled that national security wiretapping of "domestic organization[s]"
was constitutionally unreasonable without a warrant because the
threat of abuse was high and the burden on the government relatively
modest. 3 The Court repeatedly emphasized the identity of the people
monitored as key to the Court's holding: it might be a different case, the
Court suggested, if the government had been monitoring "the activities
of foreign powers" instead of domestic organizations." Several circuit
courts weighed in on the question before Congress enacted FISA in
1978. Three circuits held no warrant was needed when the government
monitored an agent of a foreign power;" one circuit disagreed in dicta
and concluded a warrant was still required. 6 Although this corner of
the law remained uncertain in 1978, the basic principle echoed that of
Katz and Keith: to know how the Fourth Amendment applied, you
needed to know who was being monitored and in what context.
C.

FISA Embraces the Person-focused Approach

When Congress began drafting foreign intelligence surveillance
bills in the mid-1970s, it naturally adopted the person-focused approach reflected in then-existing technology and constitutional law.
FISA's standards focused heavily on the identity and location of the
person monitored. The basic structure of the statute assumes that the

11 Id.
12 407 US 297 (1972).
13

idat321.

Id at 308-09.
15 See United States v Buck, 548 F2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir 1977) (noting the President's
responsibility to safeguard the nation from foreign encroachment); United States v Butenko, 494
F2d 593, 607 (3d Cir 1974) (en banc) (stating that information regarding relations of this nation
with foreign powers counsels court-ordered disclosure only in the most compelling situations);
United States v Brown, 484 F2d 418,426 (5th Cir 1973) (upholding a search based on "the President's constitutional duty to act for the United States in the field of foreign relations, and his
inherent power to protect national security in the context of foreign affairs").
16 See Zweibon v Mitchell, 516 F2d 594,602 (DC Cir 1975) ("Although ...
there should be
no category of surveillance for which the President need not obtain a warrant, our holding today
does not sweep that broadly.").
14
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government starts with a suspect and then seeks authorization to collect that person's communications. Although amendments to FISA
have made slight progress away from that 1970s ideal, the assumption
remains a basic principle of FISA.
To see why, we need to delve into FISA for just a paragraph or
two." As enacted in 1978, FISA was a surprisingly simple statute. It
banned the government from conducting "electronic surveillance"
without a FISA warrant, subject to some exceptions. The statutory
statute,M
definition of "electronic surveillance" became the core of the
covering four specific categories of surveillance that largely tracked
the three different technological methods. The most straightforward
form of electronic surveillance was wiretapping telephone lines from
inside the United States. Under the statute, the government needed a
FISA warrant to wiretap a phone call inside the US if the call was "to
or from a person in the United States" and no participant to the call
had consented. '9 The remaining three categories of surveillance were
more complicated, as they applied only when the person monitored
had a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy and a
Title III warrant would have been required in an analogous criminal
investigation." In those circumstances, the government needed to obtain a FISA warrant to install a bugging device inside the United
States,2' to intercept a call transmitted over the airwaves if all the participants to the call were inside the United States," and to intentionally target the phone calls of "a particular, known United States person who is in the United States" from either outside the United
States or within it.
As a practical matter, all four of these categories required the
government to start with a person. The first category demanded the
least amount of information: it merely required the government to
know if the call was to or from a person in the United States. The remaining categories demanded more. It was impossible to know if a
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy or whether Title III
would require a warrant in analogous settings without knowing the
specific individual context in which the communications were monitored. The reasonable expectation of privacy test is notoriously con17 For a general introduction, see David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 Stan
L & Policy Rev 487 (2006); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law,
72 Geo Wash L Rev 1306 (2004).
18 See 50 USC § 1801(f) (Supp 1978).
19 50 USC §§ 1801(f)(2), 1802(a)(1)(B) (Supp 1978).
20
50 USC § 1801(f)(1), (3)-(4) (Supp 1978).
21 50 USC § 1801(f)(4) (Supp 1978).
22 50 USC § 1801(f)(3) (Supp 1978).
23
50 USC § 1801(f)(1) (Supp 1978).
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text sensitive, and as the Fifth Circuit has complained, Title III is "a
fog of inclusions and exclusions."' , Whether a warrant would be required might depend on such details as whether the suspect was calling from home or at work," or whether calls had been placed without
paying long-distance fees.26 And of course the inclusion of monitoring
"a particular, known United States person" requires the government
to have a particular, known person in mind.
Other parts of the original statute reflected the same assumption.
To obtain a warrant, the government needed to establish probable
cause that the person targeted by the surveillance was a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power." There were two basic types of agents
of foreign powers: terrorists and foreign government spies. The government also needed to establish that the foreign power or its agent
was using the "facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance
is directed."' All of these definitions presupposed that the government began with a known target. Before it could tap a phone line or
place a bug, the government needed probable cause to believe that the
target was an agent of a foreign power and needed to know where and
in what setting the target would be communicating. The government
also needed a dossier on its target before monitoring could occur. Person first, monitoring later.
Although FISA has been amended and updated several times, the
person-focused approach has remained largely intact. The original
wiretapping and bugging authorities are essentially the same today as
they were in 1978. The definition of "electronic surveillance" has remained virtually unchanged,'o and FISA wiretapping still requires
proof that the subject of the monitoring is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power." Congress added physical search provisions allowing for searches of physical spaces" and compelling email contents

Briggs v American Air Filter Co, 630 F2d 414,415 (5th Cir 1980).
A suspect calling from work may have waived his privacy rights, creating consent to
monitoring. See 18 USC § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1976).
26
Failure to pay eall tolls triggered monitoring rights under the provider exception. See 18
USC § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1976).
27
50 USC § 1804(a)(7) (Supp 1978).
28 Compare 50 USC § 1801(c)(1) (Supp 1978) (defining terrorism), with 50 USC § 1801(d)
(Supp 1978) (defining sabotage).
29
50 USC § 1805(a)(3)(B) (Supp 1978).
30
Compare 50 USC § 1801(f) (Supp 1978), with 50 USCA § 1801(f) (2007). The only difference is a minor amendment to § 1801(f)(2) to cover computer hacking investigations; a hacker
can be monitored without requiring a court order.
31 The definition of "agent of a foreign power" has changed slightly, however. Compare 50
USC § 1801(b) (Supp 1978), with 50 USCA § 1801(b) (2007).
32
50 USC §§ 1821-29 (2000).
24
25
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from ISPs" that are similar; they require probable cause that the target of the search is a foreign power or its agent and that "the premises
or property to be searched is owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit
to or from a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.""
In contrast, the less invasive FISA authorities added after 1978
are more data-focused. Congress added subpoena-like authority to
compel evidence from third parties in the form of National Security
Letters (NSLs) and § 215 orders,35 and a pen register and trap and
trace section analogous to the pen/trap provisions used in criminal
investigations.36 These sections are keyed to whether the information
collected is relevant. The law permits data collection when "the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."37 Why the focus on information instead of people
for these particular powers? The likely reason is that pen/trap and
NSL authorities are preliminary powers. They regulate less intrusive
measures designed to reveal agents of foreign powers rather than
monitor known ones.
But should the data-focused approach of the less invasive FISA
authorities be replicated throughout the statute? In the remainder of
this essay, I make the case that it should.
II. THE NEW LAW AND TECHNOLOGY OF DATA-FOCUSED
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Let's fast-forward to the present. George W. Bush is President.
Justin Timberlake, Beyonc6, and Fergie top the pop charts." You can
buy a new Toyota Prius for about $20,000.'9 Meanwhile, over in Washington, Congress is considering amending the thirty-year-old FISA.
Should it? This Part explains why it should.
Specifically, this Part explains how the person-focused FISA of
1978 rests on assumptions about technology and constitutional law
that are often no longer valid today. The technology and constitutional
law of intelligence investigations has become heavily data-focused
33

34

50 USC § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2000).
50 USC § 1823(a)(4)(A)-(C) (2000).

35 See generally Michael J. Woods, CounterintelligenceandAccess to TransactionalRecords:
A PracticalHistory of USA PATRIOTAct Section 215, 1 J Natl Sec L & Policy 37 (2005).
36
50 USC §§ 1841-46 (2000). The parallel authorities used in criminal investigations are
found in 18 USC §§ 3121-27 (2000 & Supp 2002).
37 50 USC § 1842(c)(2) (2000 & Supp 2001).
38 This makes me miss the Bee Gees.
39

Toyota Prius-2008 Models: Pricing & Touring, online at http://www.toyota.com/prius/

models.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
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rather than person-focused. Both internet technologies and modern
Fourth Amendment law key more to information collected and less to
who sent or received it. Many investigations will unfold just as they
did in the 1970s. However, in many cases the government will not
know who sent or received particular communications or where that
person was located. Nor will it necessarily need to know that information, because location and identity are much less important than relevance. What matters is the information rather than the individual who
served as its source.
A. Foreign Intelligence Investigations Today and the
Data-focused Approach
Intelligence investigations often work very differently today because of the central role of the internet and the nature of surveillance
in packet-switched networks.' ° Whereas traditional phone calls required a closed circuit between the parties, modern communications
networks work by breaking down communications into packets and
then sending them across a sea of connected computers." This switch
has profound implications for what data the government can see and
how intelligence investigations must work.
To see why packet switching is so important, we need to understand a bit about what packets are and how packet communications
are sent and received. Packets are really just strings of zeros and ones,
each equivalent to roughly a page of information. 2 The string of data
in a packet begins with a "header," roughly equivalent to the addressing information on a letter. The header explains what the packet is
about: its origin and destination IP addresses, what kind of program it
refers to, its overall length, and other similar information. The header
is followed by the payload of the packet, which is the actual communication transferred."
Notably, computers automatically create the header when a
communication is sent; the user has little control over it. When the
communication arrives, the header normally will be discarded and not
saved." In contrast, the sender normally has control over what kind of
information appears in the payload. Although casual users normally
have no need to think of such things, those worried about detection
40 See K.A. Taipale, The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9
Yale J L & Tech 128, 143-46 (2007).
41 See id.
42
See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw U L Rev 607,649-50 (2003).
43 Id at 612-15.
44 Idat614.
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can take steps to control and minimize the information their payloads
reveal. Payloads can be encrypted, for example, or otherwise organized to reveal as much or as little information as the sender wishes.
We also need to know a little bit about how communications are
sent and received. When one computer connected to the internet
wants to send a communication to another computer, it breaks down
the communication into packets, puts headers at the front of each
packet, and then sends the packets out into the network. 5 The packets
are then shuffled along by computers known as "routers" that look at
the packet header and then direct the packet along the path that
seems likely to get the packet to its destination most quickly. Importantly, the quickest path usually bears no resemblance to how the crow
flies: packets are often routed across the country or even across the
world thanks to particularly fast channels known as internet "backbones." 4 For example, if I am in Washington and request a webpage
from a webserver in Chicago, the packets of traffic may travel to California or even a foreign country in the course of delivery.
Why do these details matter? They matter because they mean
that modern network surveillance often works very differently than
traditional telephone wiretapping or bugging. In particular, today's
surveillance tends to be divorced from the identity and location of the
parties to the communication. There is no known wire linked to a
known person with known characteristics. Instead, a surveillance device must be inserted into a stream of packet traffic that either is configured to copy all the traffic for subsequent analysis or else to filter in
real time based on known characteristics of the traffic. 7 Whether the
filter is done in real time or later on, the data stream must be screened
for known traffic characteristics rather than known identities. The focus
must be on the data, not known persons who sent or received that data.
In this new world, the location of the surveillance no longer correlates to the location of the individuals surveilled. In particular, any
point on the network will include a great deal of what James Risen has
called "transit traffic"-communications traffic that just happens to be
passing through.4" Given the dominant role of the United States in
modern communications technology, much of that transit traffic is
directed through communications switches in the United States.
45
See Preston Gralla, How the Internet Works 13-14 (Que Millennium ed 1999) (explaining the packet-based nature of internet communications).
46
See id at 5 (noting that private companies who sell access to their lines build backbones,
which are very high capacity lines that carry enormous amounts of internet traffic).
47 See Kerr, 97 Nw U L Rev at 649-51 (cited in note 42).
48 See James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration 50 (Free 2006).
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Communications service providers in the United States end up playing host to a great deal of traffic sent and received from individuals
located abroad." Monitoring a particular river of packet-based traffic
in the United States will pick up an incredible diversity of traffic, ranging from your mom's family email to parts of an encrypted phone call
0
sent from Afghanistan to Iraq."
Further, the kind of characteristics that the government might use
to identify foreign intelligence information usually no longer includes
a link to known individuals or places. Imagine the military seizes an al
Qaeda computer in Iraq and sends it for analysis. That analysis might
reveal the use of particular service providers, particular programs, particular encryption methods, or other information about traffic characteristics. However, it is unlikely to reveal anyone's identity: terrorists
presumably do not use identifying email addresses like osama.binladen
@gmail.com. Nor is it particularly likely to reveal anyone's location with
any certainty: although IP addresses can give clues to location, they are
not a clear indication of it." In this setting, the government's goal must
be to identify traffic that might provide sources of information rather
than particular individuals likely to have it. 2
B.

The Fourth Amendment Today and the Data-focused Approach

Fourth Amendment principles that apply to foreign intelligence
surveillance have also shifted since the 1970s, albeit less dramatically
than the technology. Like the technology, the law has shifted from a
person-focused approach to more of a data-focused approach. Today's
Fourth Amendment focuses less on who is monitored or in what context and more on the information collected and the programmatic
purpose of the surveillance regime.
Consider the evolution of the Fourth Amendment "search" doctrine. In 1967, Katz proclaimed that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,"" which suggested that the law would make individualized determinations into how much the government invaded a
person's privacy. But the law evolved differently. Instead of making
individualized determinations, surveillance law has tended to focus on
the methods of surveillance and the information the government colSee id at 50-51.
Id at 51-52.
51 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World
6-8 (Oxford 2006).
52
See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 245, 252 (2007)
(noting that FISA in its current form "remains usable for regulating the monitoring of communications of known terrorists, but it is useless for finding out who is a terrorist").
53 389 US at 351.
49

50
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existing law has

hardened into rules that pay little attention to identity or context.
Some techniques never amount to Fourth Amendment searches, including undercover operations, 5 the installation of pen registers,16 intercepting cordless phone calls, 7 surveillance in public," and acquiring

noncontent account records."9 Other techniques are always or virtually
always searches, such as wiretapping the contents of landline phone
calls. ' The rule-like nature of the Fourth Amendment "search" doc-

trine means that how the Fourth Amendment applies often does not
depend on who is monitored or where.6'
The law governing the reasonableness of searches has changed as
well. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that Keith was an
early application of the Fourth Amendment's "special needs" doc-

trine," which permits relaxed Fourth Amendment standards when
government actors conduct searches and seizures for reasons beyond

54 Many of the rules remain constitutionally uncertain, including those that apply to email,
text messages, and cell phone calls. See Orin S. Kerr, Computer Crime Law 298-445 (West 2006)
(analyzing the extent of Fourth Amendment protection for remotely stored and directed data).
55 See United States v White, 401 US 745, 748-54 (1971) (reasoning that because a defendant,does not have the right to exclude an informer's testimony, the defendant does not have the
right to exclude a more accurate version of it made possible by a wiretap recording).
56
See Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 741-42 (1979) (finding that a defendant assumes the
risk that information will be conveyed to others when he or she transmits that information to a
telephone company).
57 See Price v Turner, 260 F3d 1144, 1148-49 (9th Cir 2001) (holding that according to an
objective standard, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for phone
conversations that were readily susceptible to interception); In re Askin, 47 F3d 100, 104-06 (4th
Cir 1995) (same); McKamey v Roach, 55 F3d 1236, 1239-40 (6th Cir 1995) ("No reported decision has concluded that a cordless telephone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cordless phone conversations under ... the Fourth Amendment."); Tyler v Berodt, 877 F2d 705,
706-07 (8th Cir 1989) ("Courts have not accepted the assertions of privacy expectation by speakers who were aware that their conversation was being transmitted by cordless telephone.").
58 See Katz, 389 US at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); United States v Ellison,
462 F3d 557, 561 (6th Cir 2006) (en banc) (holding that information on the defendant's vehicle
license plate is not protected under the Fourth Amendment as it is subject to public view).
59 See United States v Fregoso, 60 F3d 1314, 1321 (8th Cir 1995) (holding that telephone
company customers do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in account information
held by the telephone company).
60
This is, of course, one of the lessons of Katz, 389 US at 353, and Berger v New York, 388
US 41,55-56 (1967).
61 The major exception is that a person with no voluntary contacts with the United States
has no Fourth Amendment rights under United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259, 274-75
(1990) (noting that, "for better or worse," we live in a world of nation-states and it is the responsibility of the political branches of government to determine the rules for search and seizure
regarding important American interests abroad).
62
See generally Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet": Suspicionless
Searches, "Special Needs" and General Warrants, 74 Miss L J 501 (2004) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment concern over special needs mirrors similar concerns over the general warrant doctrine).
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traditional law enforcement. Since Keith, the Supreme Court has refined and generalized the special needs doctrine; over time its emphasis has changed. Whereas Keith focused on identity, modern special
needs cases focus on the "programmatic purpose" of governmental
conduct." The initial inquiry identifies the overarching purpose of the
government's surveillance scheme rather than the identity of who is
searched or seized." The non-law enforcement interests involved are6
1
then balanced against the intrusiveness of the government's conduct.
Like the Fourth Amendment's search inquiry, reasonableness looks
less to identity and context of the person monitored and more at the
nature of the government's conduct.6
III. A DUAL APPROACH TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
Changes in technology and constitutional law since the 1970s
suggest the need for new statutory principles for foreign intelligence
investigations. In this section, I suggest a new approach: the law should
offer two distinct sets of authorization to conduct monitoring instead
of one. When the identity and/or location of the suspects monitored
are unknown, the law should focus on the nature of the information
collected. Rules governing surveillance practices should focus on the
likelihood that surveillance will yield what I call "terrorist intelligence
information" - information relevant to terrorism investigations. The
approach would focus on data rather than people.
Surveillance would revert back to a more traditional approach if
identity and/or location are known. If data-focused surveillance yields
information that is specific as to the subject's identity and location, or
such information is known from other sources, then the monitoring
should switch to operating under the traditional person-focused legal
authorities such as the existing FISA statute. The end result would be
two different regimes of communications surveillance: a data-focused
approach when identities or location are unknown and a personfocused approach when they are known.
63
See, for example, Ferguson v City of Charleston, 532 US 67,81 (2001) ("In looking to the
programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant
primary purpose.").
64 See id at 78-79 (identifying, "as an initial matter," the purpose of the drug test in question as the critical difference between the case at hand and previous similar cases); Indianapolis
v Edmond, 531 US 32, 41-42 (2000) (stating that the Court has allowed suspicionless searches
only in limited circumstances according to the intended purpose of the search).
65
Ferguson,532 US at 78.
66 Of course, identity often still matters in Fourth Amendment law. For example, a US
citizen has full Fourth Amendment rights wherever they are in the world. On the other hand, a
person with no voluntary contacts with the US lacks any Fourth Amendment rights at all. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 US at 274-75.
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A. Probabilities of Terrorist Intelligence Information
When identities and/or location are unknown, legal authority to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance should be keyed to the probabilities of collecting terrorist intelligence information. Slightly modifying language already found in FISA, terrorist intelligence information could be defined as information "relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."' 7 If the notion of relevance is too broad, the definition could be narrowed a bit to include only information "relevant and
material to an ongoing investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."
The basic approach is conservative, as it mirrors traditional
Fourth Amendment law standards used in criminal cases. Fourth
Amendment standards for probable cause and reasonable suspicion
are keyed to the likelihood of collecting evidence or contraband that
could be relevant to a criminal case. Similarly, standards for foreign
intelligence surveillance should be keyed to the likelihood of collecting information relevant to an investigation into terrorism. Exactly
what powers would correlate to what probabilities would depend on
how Congress wants to draw the privacy/security balance, which as I
noted in the Introduction is beyond the scope of this essay. But presumably, the basic notion would be to correlate the likelihood that
terrorist intelligence information will be collected with the invasiveness of the surveillance practice; the more invasive the practice, the
greater the threshold required. For example, authority to intercept
content might require probable cause, while authority to collect addressing information might require reasonable suspicion or even a
lower standard.
One important advantage of this approach is that if a warrant
process is used at this early stage, warrants could be issued based on
traffic characteristics when identities are unknown and unknowable.
For example, the government may have discovered clues of likely traffic patterns or practices characteristic of traffic that yield terrorist intelligence information. Perhaps the government has discovered that
particular service providers, software programs, encryption methods,
or combinations of all of the above are particularly likely to reveal
such information. Instead of having to establish that the communications are likely to involve "agents of foreign powers," or that they are
located in any particular place, the government would focus simply
and directly on the likelihood that the particular surveillance tech-
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50 USCA § 1842(c)(2) (2007).
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nique would reveal the information sought.6' The identity of the individuals and their location would become irrelevant.
B.

Particularity and Terrorist Intelligence Information

Basing surveillance rules on the probability of collecting terrorist
intelligence information raises important questions of warrant particularity. Particularity refers to the scope of the surveillance permitted by
a court order. 69 Probability and particularity are always linked; the
broader the permitted surveillance, the greater the likelihood that it will
uncover some kind of evidence at some point. If a warrant is broad
enough, the chances that it will collect relevant information approaches
100 percent. So the key question is, assuming Congress wants to monitor the first stage of surveillance with warrants, how particular should
warrants keyed to terrorist intelligence information become?
Particularity wasn't a major issue when FISA was adopted because focusing on a person ensures particularity. Warrants will be particular when identity comes first; monitoring limited to a known specific person attempts to target only that person's communications.
Consider a traditional 1970s-style wiretapping case. If the FBI thinks
that Bob is a Soviet spy and seeks to tap his phone calls, the natural
scope of the surveillance is any phone call believed to be by or to Bob.
Tapping the neighbor's phone, or the telephone of a random person
across town, makes no sense at all. After tapping Bob's phone and
collecting the calls, the government can then minimize the recorded
communications and use the relevant information.
Switching to an information-based surveillance system over a
modern packet-switched network makes particularity extremely important, however. Whereas person-based monitoring implied particularity, data-focused monitoring requires difficult line drawing. Here's
an example. Imagine that the government has reason to believe that
an al Qaeda cell uses a particular ISP in Kabul and a particular type of
software to communicate about a terrorist plot targeting the United
States. In this case, the government has probable cause to believe that
monitoring the ISP would uncover terrorist intelligence information.
But how broad can the monitoring be? Can the government look at
all of the traffic coming to or from that ISP in Kabul? Or can it only
look at traffic to or from that ISP that uses that particular software?
68 Consider United States v Grubbs, 547 US 90, 96-97 (2006) (stating that in evaluating the
constitutionality of anticipatory warrants, which are no different in principle than ordinary warrants, probable cause analysis should consider the likelihood that the sought-after material will
be present at the site of the search).
69
See Maryland v Garrison,480 US 79, 84-85 (1987) (explaining that the intended purpose
of the particularity requirement was to limit general searches).
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Or only some specific portion of the traffic from that ISP using that
software? How about every communication to or from Afghanistan
that uses the software? How particular must the surveillance be-and
more specifically, how narrowly must a warrant authorizing the surveillance be written?
The Constitution offers little guidance on this issue, but it likely
imposes only very modest and deferential limits on the scope of moni-

toring. First, we don't know if the Fourth Amendment demands a warrant at all for this sort of surveillance." Second, the particularity requirement is practical and context sensitive; courts often state that the
requirement is relaxed when there is no practical way to draft a war-

rant more narrowly to collect the evidence sought. 7' To the extent that
the Fourth Amendment does speak to the question, the Keith case

suggests that the guide is a balancing of interests: warrants can be constitutionally particular so long as their breadth is "reasonable both in
relation to the legitimate need of Government" and any competing
Fourth Amendment rights.72

This standard likely permits quite broad monitoring in most circumstances. If the government has probable cause, the legitimate
needs of government will be clear; it generally will be difficult to limit
the monitoring without making it less effective. On the other hand, the
competing Fourth Amendment interests will often be vague and hypothetical. Only individuals who have voluntary contacts with the United

States enjoy Fourth Amendment rights," and how much heavily computerized national security monitoring infringes whatever rights that
exist remains highly unclear. Given that, the constitutional balance

likely can be struck in favor of quite broad government monitoring in
most cases.
Should narrower monitoring be required as a matter of policy? I

don't know of a principled way to enforce more limited monitoring.
70 There are two reasons for this. First, the special needs exception may make a warrant
unnecessary. Second, the individuals monitored may lack a sufficient connection to the United
States under Verdugo-Urquidez to have Fourth Amendment rights in the first place.
71
See, for example, United States v One Parcel of Real Property Described as Lot 41, 128
F3d 1386, 1394 (10th Cir 1997) ("[T]he warrant was as particular as it could be and, therefore,
comported with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."). Notably, however, the precedents consider particularity with respect to the items to be seized, not the places to be searched.
See, for example, United States v Harris,903 F2d 770, 775 (10th Cir 1990) ("A warrant that describes items to be seized in broad and generic terms may be valid if the description is as specific
as circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit."). It is unclear how the
same concept would apply to "places to be searched," which presumably would be the question
for the scope of surveillance.
72 407 US at 322-23.
73 See United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259,274-75 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to the defendant, a Mexican citizen whose Mexican home was searched).
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There are many ways to limit monitoring, based on ranges of IP addresses, particular programs, or other identifying characteristics, but
it's hard to devise a rule that would be nonarbitrary in light of the
wide range of ways technology can be manipulated. A requirement of
"reasonable" particularity judged on a case-by-case basis may be the
best standard.
C.

A Dual-path Approach

Importantly, I envision this approach working in tandem with the
existing person-focused approach found in the current FISA statute.
Congress should enact two sets of surveillance rules: a data-focused
regime when identity and location are not known with certainty, and a
person-focused regime when identity and location become known."
Under this proposal, surveillance could occur in two stages. In the first
stage, when identity remains unknown, the government could use the
one-size-fits-all data-focused approach to surveillance. The government would be allowed to conduct broad monitoring for a particular
window of time based on probable cause to identify terrorist intelligence information. However, if the surveillance yields information
that establishes identity and/or the location of the individuals monitored-or if that information happens to be known for other reasons,
such as in a traditional foreign government spying case-the rules
would switch to a traditional person-focused approach.
The strength of this approach is that it would best fit the regime
to the circumstances. When identity and location are known, it may be
unnecessary to rely solely on probabilities of data collection. Instead,
the law can channel the monitoring into more definite rules depending on what is known of identity and location. For example, imagine
two investigations that begin with known data about a likely terror
cell. The government obtains warrants authorizing the surveillance in
both cases. In the first case, the government learns that the cell is located in Iraq and appears to consist entirely of non-US persons. In the
second case, the government learns that the cell is located in Brooklyn
and includes US citizens. Under a dual-pronged approach, the discovery of identity and location could lead the monitoring to switch over
to different rules. For example, the monitoring of the group known to
be outside the United States could occur without any judicial oversight; the monitoring of the group that includes US citizens in the
United States could occur pursuant to a traditional FISA warrant.

74 I read Judge Posner's contribution in this symposium to suggest something similar. See
generally Posner, 75 U Chi L Rev 245 (cited in note 52).
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There may be difficult questions of when the switch from the first
regime to the second should occur. Perhaps monitoring should be allowed under the first regime until identity or location become clearly
known, however long that may take. Alternatively, perhaps monitoring
under the first regime should be allowed for only a specific window of
time. Unfortunately, it is difficult if not impossible to resolve such operational questions without access to the classified details of how investigations actually work. The basic goal should be to tailor the regime to the context of the known facts; how to implement that goal
depends on the specifics of how national security investigations work
that remain classified.
D.

Objections

There are two serious objections to my proposal. The first is that I
have left out the most important question: what should the rules be at
the initial stage? Should the initial stage be regulated by a warrant
process, or should the initial stage remain unregulated by the courts
until identities become known? Here I fall back on my initial caveat:
where to draw the line between security and privacy is beyond the
scope of this essay. Those who tilt towards the security end of the scale
likely will want the initial stage to remain unregulated; those who tilt
towards the privacy side likely will want a default warrant requirement. I take no position on which approach is preferable, as my goal is
to offer a new framework rather than resolve its application.
A second criticism is that my approach simply makes an implicit
practice explicit. That is, the intelligence community must already have
some default practices that are followed before identities become
known. If the law hinges on identity, some presumptions must be followed before identities are apparent. This is true, but I think making
those presumptions explicit would be a major step forward. The government's presumptions and default practices are classified, which
means that no one on the outside knows how the executive branch
translates the concepts of FISA into operating rules. Amending FISA
to account for these existing stages would bring the executive's practice into the open so Congress could make the decision of how to
regulate the initial stage. The details of how the intelligence agencies
execute the commands of FISA will always be and should always be
hidden from public view. But the basic choice of how to regulate surveillance when identities are unknown can and should be made in the
open by Congress.
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CONCLUSION

Recommending changes to the law of national security investigations always suffers from the veil of secrecy that surrounds them. The
investigations are classified. As outsiders, we're stuck trying to get a
sense of the present practice and how to improve it based only on a
small set of clues. Recommendations for reform are necessarily based
on guesses-guesses of how cases work, of how they progress, and of
how much the balance between privacy and security might change
depending on particular changes in the rules.
My hope is that my proposal is general enough to be useful despite that difficulty. At bottom, it rests on a basic difference between
traditional physical and telephone investigations and the new internet
investigations. The former starts with individuals and then collects
data; the latter normally will start with data and then try to connect
the data to people. My basic contribution is that the switch requires
different legal regimes owing to the different facts of the different
types of investigations. Unless this principle is recognized in FISA, it is
likely to operate sub silentio rather than out in the open. For example,
the Protect America Act of 2007 implicitly recognizes this new problem: its major alteration to FISA is the explicit conclusion of surveillance "directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of
the United States." 75 It then provides for a certification before the FISA
court that "there are reasonable procedures in place for determining
that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information ... concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States."7' 6
The fact that the new statute focuses on procedures designed to
monitor those "reasonably believed" to be outside the United States
should reinforce the importance of monitoring rules when location
and identity are often difficult to identify. Under the new statute, the
government must enact "procedures" for developing default answers
to how the major categories of the existing statute fit. Although the
FISA court has some modest role in approving these procedures, for
the most part the rules at these early stages are unknown. But in an
internet age these procedures are as important as the statute itself; in
a world where location and identity are unknown, means of implementation become as important as former rules based on unknowable
categories. Instead of keeping these defaults secret, Congress should
regulate them specifically; the rules should be chosen in public by
Congress rather than in secret by the executive branch.
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